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This section 101 issue [on patentable subject matter] appears to have
its foundation in a misunderstanding of patent policy, for the debate
about patent eligibility under section 101 swirls about concern for the
public’s right to study the scientific and technologic knowledge
contained in patents. The premise of the debate is incorrect, for
patented information is not barred from further study and
experimentation in order to understand and build upon the knowledge
disclosed in the patent.
Judicial clarification is urgently needed to restore the understanding
that patented knowledge is not barred from investigation and research.
The debate involving section 101 would fade away, on clarification of
the right to study and experiment with the knowledge disclosed in
patents. 1

For nearly 200 years, the U.S. patent regime incorporated a defense
allowing scientists to use patented inventions without authorization, so
long as the purpose was for basic research. Over the last two decades,
however, this defense, along with other public-regarding doctrines, has
* Pauline Newman Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. The author was a member of the
National Academies Committees on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge Based Economy
and on Intellectual Property Rights in Genomic and Protein-Related Inventions, as well as the
Department of Health and Human Services Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health,
and Society. The reports of these committees are discussed below. She also signed the Banbury
Statement, likewise mentioned infra.
1. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman,
J., dissenting), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
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been eviscerated. The repercussions are significant. 2 In 2006, in a dissent
from the denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer announced that in his view,
patents could now “impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.’” 3 Unsurprisingly, in a series of subsequent cases
interpreting § 101 of the Patent Act, 4 which sets out the core
requirements of patentability, the Supreme Court restricted the
availability of patents for fundamental scientific advances. In the life
sciences, it held that natural phenomena and laws of nature must be
freely available to all innovators and are not the appropriate subject
matter for patent protection. 5 In other areas, such as software, the Court
emphasized the unpatentability of abstract ideas. 6
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s § 101
jurisprudence is creating uncertainties that have a deleterious impact on
business and innovation, particularly in the life sciences. 7 While
incentives to invent must now be discounted by the risk that
nonpatentability will affect the profits of firms engaged in medical
research, the patents that do issue can continue to exert substantial
control over subsequent generations of innovators. As the quotation
above from a dissenting opinion by Judge Pauline Newman suggests,
however, the concerns about impeding research could be assuaged in a
very different way. Instead of denying patents because of concerns that
they will chill progress, the experimental use defense could be clarified
so that it is clear that patent rights cannot impede upstream research. An
2. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 457 (2004); Part I, infra.
3. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017).
5. See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(both in the life sciences). The Court has also raised the inventive step. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). The Federal Circuit has followed through by narrowing the scope of
claims. See Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (2010) (written description); Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736-37 (2002), vacating 234 F.3d
558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (doctrine of equivalents).
6. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609-10 (2010) (business method); Alice v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355-56 (2014) (computerized business method). The Court has also raised
the inventive step, KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418, and the Federal Circuit has followed through by
narrowing the scope of claims, see Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d 1336 (written description); Festo
Corp., 535 U.S. at 736-37.
7. See, e.g., David Rodham & Brad Sheafe, Who Will Protect Life Sciences Innovation?,
(June
2016),
available
at
http://dominionharbor.com/wpCORPCOUNSEL.COM
content/uploads/2016/06/How-to-Protect-Life-Science-Innovations.pdf. Cf., Where Do We Stand
One Year After Alice?, LAW 360 (June 17, 2015), available at http://www.law360.com/
articles/668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-after-alice.
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attempt along these lines was made in 2011 as part of the America
Invents Act (the AIA). 8 That effort failed, but another legislative
package of patent reforms is likely to be introduced in the near future. 9
This Article, based on the Oldham Lecture at the University of Akron,10
makes the case for including a statutory provision to protect a
researcher’s ability to use patented inputs, a proposal that could be
coupled with new language in § 101 that clarifies the availability of
patents on fundamental scientific discoveries.
My argument focuses on the field of life sciences, although similar
issues may well exist in other fields where the output of basic science is
closely associated with marketable products. The Article proceeds as
follows. Part I traces the demise of the experimental use defense and
then discusses the many significant changes that have occurred
subsequent to the AIA’s failure to revive this defense legislatively. Part
II argues that these changes militate in favor of a renewed effort to enact
a research defense. Using European Union (EU) patent law as an
example, this part compares the U.S. patent regime to the system in
other developed countries and shows why the current situation could
lead to research arbitrage, brain drain, and—ultimately—the loss of U.S.
technological dominance. Part III discusses proposals to restore an
experimental use defense.
I. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE DEFENSE
A.

The History

Until the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, a research defense
was securely enshrined in U.S. law. In two 1813 cases, Justice Joseph
Story interpreted the Patent Act as distinguishing between uses of the
patented invention “with an intent to . . . profit” and uses “for the mere
purpose of philosophical experiment or to ascertain the verity and
exactness of the specification.” 11 As William Robinson summarized the
8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.).
9. See, e.g., H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015-2016); Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent
Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, available at http://www.patentprogress.org/patentprogress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation/ (last visited _March 7,
2017).
10. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Pauline Newman Professor of Law at New York University School
of Law and co-Director of its Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, The Albert & Vern
Oldham 2016 Fall Lecture: Reconsidering Experimental Use (Nov. 4, 2016).
11. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (Story, J.). See also Whittemore
v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
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conclusion to be drawn from these cases:
[W]here [the patented invention] is made or used as an experiment,
whether for the gratification of scientific tastes, or for curiosity, or for
amusement, the interests of the patentee are not antagonized, the sole
effect being of an intellectual character in the promotion of . . .
knowledge.
But if the products of the experiment are sold, or used for the
convenience of the experimentor, or . . . with a view to the adaptation
of the invention to the experimentor’s business, the acts of making or
of use are violations of the rights of the inventor and infringements of
his patent. 12

Justice Story’s carefully constructed exception began to crumble soon
after the establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982.
At the time the Federal Circuit was established, efforts were being
made to foster a generic drug industry with the hope that, after patent
expiration or invalidation, the generics would sell medicines at lower
prices than the originators charged and lower the cost of healthcare. In
1983, one such generic firm, Bolar, decided to market the generic
equivalent of Dalmane, a sleep disorder medication, as soon as the
patent expired. 13 To be ready at that time, Bolar conducted studies
during the term of the patent to meet a preclearance requirement that it
demonstrate to the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the
bioequivalence of its formulation to the originator’s version. 14 When
Roche, the originator, sued for infringement, Bolar defended on the
ground that its use was, if not exactly experimental in the Justice Story
sense of the term, in the public’s interest nonetheless, and therefore
should be exempt from infringement liability. 15 The Federal Circuit
disagreed. In Roche v. Bolar, it held that it is “the role of Congress to
maximize public welfare through legislation.” 16 Thus, the court declined
to extend the experimental use exception to cover this rather clear
commercial use. 17
Significantly, Congress quickly stepped in. In the Hatch Waxman
Act of 1984, 18 it provided originator firms with the opportunity to extend
12.
(1890).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898 Vol. III
Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 865.
Id.
Id. at 863.
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc (2000) and
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the term of their patents to cover delays caused by their own premarket
clearance obligations. 19 In exchange, the legislature created an exception
to infringement liability:
to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import
into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs or veterinary biological products. 20

But despite Congress’s embrace of room for experimentation in Hatch
Waxman, in several subsequent cases the Federal Circuit further
narrowed the exception, doubling (really, tripling) down on Bolar.
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., the court held that an
academic scientist, in trying to find a cheap and effective way to design
around a patent for a method for inoculating chicks in ovo against
disease, infringed the patent. 21 According to the court, the common law
defense was inapplicable, even though the work was conducted at a
university for research purposes, because the ultimate intent was
commercial. 22 Indeed, Judge Randall Rader would have gone further. In
a concurring opinion, he suggested “the Patent Act leaves no room for
any de minimis or experimental use excuses for infringement.” 23
Madey v. Duke University provided the court with the opportunity
to bring the law closer to Judge Rader’s vision. 24 In that case, Duke
University was using patented laser technology in its teaching and
research laboratories. 25 Duke did not have a license from the patentee
because (like all nonprofit universities) it thought pure academic
research and teaching to be quintessential examples of “philosophical”
experimentation. 26 The Federal Circuit disagreed. It rejected the
curiosity/profit distinction that had driven previous case law and instead
looked to whether the conduct at issue was “in keeping with the alleged
infringer’s
legitimate
business,
regardless
of
commercial
implications.” 27 Since Duke’s objectives in using the laser—education

35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2017).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2017).
21. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1352 (Rader, J., concurring).
24. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1362.
27. Id.
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and enlightenment—increased the university’s status and attracted
lucrative research grants, as well as great students and a distinguished
faculty, the court concluded that its acts could not “qualify for the very
narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.” 28
Embrex and Madey concerned the common law defense developed
by Justice Story. 29 The third case, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA, interpreted the Hatch Waxman Act’s statutory defense. 30 In this
case, the patent covered a compound that promoted the healing of
wounds. 31 Suspecting that the compound might also halt tumor growth,
the defendant conducted its research without authorization, reasoning
that if the work panned out, it would submit its data for regulatory
approval of what would be a new treatment for cancer. 32 In a suit
brought by the patent holder, the Federal Circuit found the activity
infringing. 33 Just as it had narrowed the common law defense, the court,
per Judge Rader, stressed congressional use of the term “solely” and
held that the Hatch Waxman Act defense applied only to clinical testing
(that is, patient testing) of pharmaceuticals already on the market. In
other words, Judge Rader confined the exemption to the situation present
in Bolar. 34
Significantly, Judge Pauline Newman dissented in part.35 She was
not on the panels in Embrex or Madey, so she used her participation in
Integra to challenge the Federal Circuit’s growing hostility to
experimentation. 36 In her view,
[t]he purpose of a patent system is not only to provide a financial
incentive to create new knowledge and bring it to public benefit
through new products; it also serves to add to the body of published
scientific/technologic knowledge. The requirement of disclosure of the
details of patented inventions facilitates further knowledge and
understanding of what was done by the patentee, and may lead to
further technologic advance. The right to conduct research to achieve
such knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of the
patent. That is not the law, and it would be a practice impossible to
28. Id.
29. See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 307 F.3d 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
30. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 864-65 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
vacated, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD., 545 U.S. 193, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
31. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD., at 862-63.
32. Id. at 863.
33. Id. at 872.
34. Id. at 866-68.
35. Id. at 872.
36. Id. at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting in part).
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administer. Yet today the court disapproves and essentially eliminates
the common law research exemption. This change of law is ill-suited
to today’s research-founded, technology-based economy. 37

Thus, according to Judge Newman, the court should have determined
that the defendant’s research did not infringe on the plaintiff’s patent.
Judge Newman’s position found considerable support in the
broader research community and among legal scholars. For example, in
a report that heavily influenced the contours of patent reform, A Patent
System for the 21st Century, the National Academies of Science
Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge Based
Economy questioned the result in Madey. 38 While the Report
acknowledged that a study funded by the National Academies on
academic research showed that among academics there was “widespread
indifference to the existence of patents” on research inputs,39 the
Committee nonetheless argued that there were several worrisome trends.
These trends included an increase in demand letters, an expansion in
patenting research tools, and a rise in reliance on exclusive licenses. 40
The Committee reviewed several scholarly papers and proposed a
research exemption, called for further consideration of the issue, and
suggested that funding agencies condition financial support on
agreements that researchers make their discoveries available to other
researchers. 41 The Committee on Intellectual Property Rights on
Genomic and Protein Research and Innovation, also organized under the
auspices of the National Academies, reiterated these concerns in a
subsequent study. 42 Significantly, it did so despite a second National
37. Id.
38. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 10812 (Stephen A. Merrill et al., 2004).
39. See John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents
and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285,
292-93 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill 2003). See also John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora, &
Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003).
40. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 38, at 109-10. See also, PATENTS IN
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, supra note 39.
41. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 38 at 110-17, citing Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1017 (1989); see Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (2000); see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting
Genetic Material: A Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (F. Scott Kieff 2003); see Katherine J. Strandburg,
What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81
(2004). See also Dreyfuss, supra note 2.
42. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND
PROTEOMIC RESEARCH (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza, 2006) [hereinafter REAPING THE
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Academies-sponsored study (by a team that included the same
researchers as the earlier study) showing that scientists ignore patents.43
Other voices expressed similar views. The American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA), a group heavily composed of patent
holders, endorsed an experimental use defense, arguing that the failure to
include “a definitive provision in the patent law exempting
experimentation can create many potential adverse consequences,
including threatened patent litigation, complicated licensing
negotiations, efforts to secure compensation based upon the fruits of any
experimentation (including ‘reach-through’ royalties), royalty stacking,
and delays in starting experiments until patent issues can be resolved.”44
At around the same time, several scholars came out in favor of an
experimental use defense and made specific suggestions for crafting
such a measure. 45
Despite this support, a legislative fix to the research problem was
not included in the bills that culminated in the AIA. There were several
reasons. First, as with the National Academies studies, other follow-ups
were interpreted as failing to show a significant problem developing in
the research arena. 46 Scientists were ignoring patents, and patentees were
ignoring scientists—perhaps because the patentees thought that any
advance the scientists discovered would lead to new downstream
products that would be covered by their patents. Second, various selfhelp measures were developed to supplement the proclivities of
scientists. These included guidelines issued by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and the Association of University Technology Managers
BENEFITS].
43. See John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, Patents, Material Transfers and
Access to Research Inputs in Biomedical Research, in FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES’ COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEININVENTIONS
(2005),
available
at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
RELATED
download?doi=10.1.1.531.1401&rep=rep1&type=pdf; John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho, & Wesley M.
Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002 (2005).
44. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF AIPLA SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL’S REPORT ON REAPING THE BENEFITS
OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH 29 (2006), available at http://www.aipla.org/
advocacy/executive/Documents/NAS092304.pdf.
45. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
supra note 40; see Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001);
Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United
States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1650-51 (2001).
46. Claude Barfield & John E. Calfee, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PATENT SYSTEM:
BALANCING INNOVATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 40-43 (AEI Press, 2007).
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(AUTM), which encouraged research institutions to adopt nonexclusive
licensing practices and to reserve the rights of academic researchers to
use patented inputs without authorization. 47
Third, and perhaps most important, the biotechnology community
saw an experimental use defense as a threat to its business model. At the
time, most biomedical research was intensely upstream—the discoveries
concerned basic information on living organisms, including genetic
sequences, metabolic pathways, regulatory mechanisms, and methods
for manipulating these discoveries. While consumer benefits were in the
offing, at the time of the debate over patent reform, the commercial
significance of these advances was largely as research inputs. Thus,
unlike the firms represented by AIPLA, which principally held patents
on consumer end-use products such as small-molecule medicines (and
wanted the freedom to experiment in order to bring these products to
market), the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) was
concerned that a research exemption, if too broadly drafted or too
generously interpreted, would interfere with the ability of its members to
license their innovations and thereby jeopardize their ability to fund
future research. After all, if the core use of a technology is in research,
then a research exemption would obviate the need for anyone to pay
tribute to the inventor. 48 With so many other controversial issues on the
reform agenda, proponents of the AIA chose to delete a proposal on
experimental use rather than to fight BIO.
B.

The Backlash

Even before the AIA was enacted, it became increasingly clear that
the decision to shrink the ambit of the experimental use defense would
create difficulties for the innovation environment. To start, there is a
profound normative question as to whether a legal regime can be said to
be running smoothly if it functions satisfactorily only because important
participants ignore the rule of law. The legal system requires many
things of the scientific community: adherence to environmental
47. Id. at 54; In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University
Technology, ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS (March 6, 2007), available at
http://www.autm.net/advocacy-topics/government-issues/principles-and-guidelines/nine-points-toconsider-when-licensing-university/.
48. See Barfield & Calfee, supra note 46, at 61-63; The Patent Reform Act of 2007 Coalition Letter, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANIZATION (BIO) (Oct. 23, 2007), available at
https://www.bio.org/advocacy/letters/patent-reform-act-2007-coalition-letter
(warning
about
weakening the enforceability of validly issued patents); John Raidt, PATENTS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
32
(U.S.
Chamber
of
Commerce
Foundation
2014),
available
at
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/article/foundation/RaidtPaper.pdf.
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standards, fidelity to civil rights laws, and observance of pedagogical
responsibilities to students. Relying on scientists to ignore patents
arguably encourages the flouting of these other important legal standards
and social norms. Moreover, such a regime can have an adverse impact
on the careers of risk averse (which is to say, law- abiding) scientists.
Equally as important, a closer look at the studies the National
Academies commissioned showed that they did not fully support the
notion that the availability of a research exemption was irrelevant. While
the official take-away was that scientists ignore patents, the studies had
also noted that material transfer agreements (MTAs) were delaying
research. 49 While MTAs can be viewed as an alternative mechanism for
retaining exclusive rights over research (meaning that the problems
researchers faced were not about patenting), the difficulty in concluding
MTAs was arguably caused by difficulties in allocating patent rights
over the fruits of the work that would be accomplished with the patented
inputs. Besides, the National Academies studies both consisted of
surveys of scientists who, in many cases, were the heads of research
labs. Their subjective beliefs as to whether patents were inhibiting their
research may have suffered from cognitive deficiencies. Research
directors are not always aware of delays at the lab bench. In some cases,
they may know there was delay but may attribute it to the wrong cause,
such as lazy postdocs. In addition, they may have subconsciously altered
their research agendas in order to stay away from areas where patents
were prevalent or known to be enforced vigorously.
Studies relating the quantity of research to more objective factors
soon appeared, including two papers by Fiona Murray that pointed in the
opposite direction from the National Academies studies. In the first,
Murray exploited the fact that prior to 1999, patent applications were
confidential until the patent issued (leaving a period of two or more
years before the existence of the patent was knowable). She compared
papers in Nature Biotechnology that had a patent pair (that is, a patent
issued on the research results) to see how often these papers were cited
in the time period before the patent issued compared to the citation rate
after issuance. She then compared that result with the ratio of citation
rates for papers that were published at the same time, but which were not
associated with patents. She found that citation rates fell faster for papers
with a corresponding patent than for the others, suggesting that research
decreases once a patent is issued.50 In the second study, she compared

49.
50.

See Barfield & Calfee, supra note 46, at 40 n.4 (which appears on p. 96).
Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free
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the citation rates of patented oncomice (mice bred to contract cancer)
during the time when the patent holder charged a monopoly price for the
mice with citation rates after the patent holder dropped the price to
competitive levels. Much more research—and more varied research—
was published once the mice were easily accessible.51
Anecdotal evidence of patent problems also accumulated,
especially around genetic inventions. Most prominently, Myriad
Genetics, the holder of patents on BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 gene sequences,
which mutate in ways that are associated with early onset breast cancer,
developed a diagnostic test that it refused to license to other laboratories.
As a result, only Myriad could test patients: second-opinion testing
became unavailable, patients whose insurance companies did not deal
with Myriad could not obtain reimbursement for the tests, and there was
no non-infringing way to test Myriad’s work for accuracy or to see
whether Myriad was staying abreast of new scientific developments. 52
Most alarmingly, researchers looking for other causes of early onset
breast cancer could not use the test to exclude patients whose condition
was attributable to BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 mutations. 53 Frustrations
regarding discrepancies between patient histories and Myriad reports led
to a storm of protest within the genetics community, a comprehensive
study of the genetics sector which demonstrated other social problems
caused or exacerbated by exclusive patents rights over genetic tests,54
and ultimately, a 2010 report by a committee organized by the
Department of Health and Human Services recommending a research

Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON.
BEHAVIOR & ORG. 648, 664-69 (2007).
51. See Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run
Supply of Public Knowledge: Evidence from Human Genetics, 52 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT J.
1193 (2009). See also Heidi Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from
the Human Genome, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1, 24 (2013) (showing that more work was done on genes in
a public data base than on genes kept as trade secrets).
52. See generally, E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the
Policy Storm, 12 (4 SUPP.) GENET. MED. S39 (2010).
53. See Declaration of David H. Ledbetter, Appendix at 1505, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. UPTO, 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing the situation at Emory), available at
http://www.pubpat.org/assets/files/brca/CAFC/Appendix/A968%20to%20A3073%20Part%203%20
of%207.pdf & Declaration of Ellen T. Matloff, id. at 3020 (describing situation at Yale).
54. Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Gene Patents and Licensing: Case Studies
Prepared for the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, 12 (4 SUPPL.)
GENET MED. S-1 (2011). See also Robert Cook-Deegan, John M. Conley, James P. Evans & Daniel
Vorhaus, The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUROPEAN
J. HUMAN GENETICS 585 (2013) (revealing Myriad’s unwillingness to deposit the mutations it
discovered into publicly-accessible data bases).
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exemption for those who use patented genes for research purposes. 55
By 2005, the Supreme Court had also entered the fray. In a
unanimous opinion citing Judge Newman’s dissent in Integra, the Court
held that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the Hatch Waxman Act’s
statutory exemption was too stingy. 56 Reversing the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Integra, Justice Scalia focused on the language of the statute
and emphasized that research had to be only “reasonably” related to the
submission of information for premarket clearance to merit use of the
exemption. 57 Thus, he reasoned, preclinical studies for the purpose of
finding other medical uses for a patented composition were
permissible. 58 But even though much of the Court’s opinion showed an
appreciation for scientific research, the decision did not go very far in
creating space for experimentation. Thus, the Court cautioned that
[b]asic scientific research on a particular compound, performed
without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief
that the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the
researcher intends to induce, is surely not ‘reasonably related to the
development and submission of information’ to the FDA. 59

Even more obviously, research in areas unrelated to pharmaceuticals
could not rely on the Hatch Waxman defense because there was no need
to submit such data “under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .” 60
Still, the problem of fundamental research clearly bothered the
Court. In a 2006 dissent from the dismissal of certiorari in a case about
medical diagnostics, Justice Breyer declared that “sometimes too much
patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objective of patent and
copyright protection.” 61 In four subsequent cases, the Court sharply
reduced the ambit of protection for fundamental life sciences research

55. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING
PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS: REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY 97 (2010), available at
http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf.
56. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005).
57. Id.
58. Id. (the “exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the development and submission of any [regulatory] information”).
59. Id. at 205-06.
60. Id. at 195.
61. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and for abstract inventions. 62 Specifically, in Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Labs., the Supreme Court held that the
correlation between the dosage level of a drug and the blood level of a
metabolite of the drug is an unpatentable law of nature.63 In Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., it invalidated Myriad’s
claims to the BRCA 1 and 2 sequences on the ground that genomic DNA
(gDNA) is a phenomenon of nature. In so holding, the Court noted that
“without this exception, there would be considerable danger that the
grant of patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit
future innovation premised upon them.’” 64 Along the way, in KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court also raised the inventive step,
thus making it more difficult to show that an invention is nonobvious
enough to merit patent protection. 65 Moreover, the Court made it
difficult to escape Mayo’s bar on patenting laws of nature by adding a
treatment step. In Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., the
Court stressed that infringement requires one entity to perform every
step of the patent claim. 66 For diagnostic inventions this is a problem
because an advanced diagnostic such as gene testing is rarely performed
by the person who treats the patient.
The consequences for the life sciences are acute. DNA sequences
are no longer patentable and, presumably, neither are other naturally
occurring materials such as proteins, RNA, hormones, enzymes, or
vitamins, all of which may have therapeutic significance and which may
be expensive to test for regulatory approval and to commercialize. Basic
diagnostics are also unprotectable. The poster child for the change is
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 67 which involved a way to
detect genetic defects in a fetus by examining paternally-inherited fetal
DNA isolated from the mother’s blood. 68 The developers were the first
to realize that paternal DNA was available for testing, but their patent
was held invalid for several reasons: the DNA is not patentable under
Myriad; while the inventors had to isolate the DNA and make enough of
it to analyze, these are standard techniques and not inventive enough per
62. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297
(2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (both
in the life sciences) and Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609-10 (2010); Alice v. CLS Bank Int’l,
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2361 (2014) (computerized business methods).
63. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1297.
64. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (internal citation omitted).
65. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
66. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2117.
67. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
68. Id. at 1373.
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KSR; and, as the Federal Circuit held, the relationship between paternal
DNA and the characteristics of the fetus is a law of nature, and therefore
runs afoul of Mayo. 69 Despite this ruling, the method is revolutionary:
for a range of potential defects, it substitutes a simple blood test for
amniocentesis, thereby obviating the risk of miscarriage that is inherent
in sampling amniotic fluid. 70 Although the scientific community as a
whole questioned the outcome—twenty-two amicus curiae briefs
supported a petition for review—the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 71
II. REPERCUSSIONS
There is irony here. The biotechnology community was opposed to
a research defense because it was concerned that the defense would
jeopardize the revenue stream from its research tools. What it has now is
a patent system that jeopardizes the revenue stream from many of its key
innovations: therapeutics based on naturally occurring compounds,
diagnostics to determine a patient’s condition or to decide on therapeutic
sufficiency, as well as so-called companion diagnostics (“personalized
medicine”)—methods for testing whether a patient will respond to a
particular therapy. 72 In the run up to the AIA, BIO wanted to leave well
enough alone. Instead, it must now deal with the worst of all possible
worlds. It must cope with a system that sharply reduces incentives to
innovate in an arena where the cost of getting to market can be
extremely high, 73 yet the law does nothing to fix the research problem
created by the patents that do issue. There is also irony in terms of what
the Court sought to accomplish. Justice Breyer’s call was to promote the
progress of science; he apparently assumed that without patents,
fundamental advances will become freely available for the use of all
researchers. In fact, however, firms in the life sciences industries may

69. Id. at 1373-74.
70. Id. at 1379.
71. Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016); for a list of amici,
see Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/sequenom-inc-v-ariosa-diagnostics-inc/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
72. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 J. SCI. & TECH. 246 (2015).
73. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Jacob S. Sherkow, The Changing Life Sciences Patent
Landscape, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 292 (2016); Damian Garde, The Supreme Court’s
Decision That’s Shaking Up Biotech, STAT (June 27, 2016), available at
https://www.statnews.com/2016/06/27/supreme-court-biotech-patents/. See also Joseph A. DiMasia,
Henry G. Grabowskibi & Ronald W. Hans, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629616000291 (finding that the lifecycle
cost per approved drug is close to $3 billion).
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change their focus to inventions that can be kept as trade secrets,74 yet
secrecy may be more inhibiting of scientific growth than patents.
Alternatively, the industry may demand other sorts of incentives, such as
tax preferences and prizes, which may not be forthcoming and may
create inefficiencies or impose new forms of control over research
agendas. 75
To make matters even worse, firms in other countries operate in a
diametrically opposite legal environment: patents are generally available
on biotechnological inventions, but there is a set of doctrines that
protects research and the broader public interest.76 The situation in the
EU furnishes an example. The law on patentability in all EU countries is
established by the European Patent Convention (EPC), 77 which has no
equivalent to the exclusions for natural products and laws of nature that
the Supreme Court found in § 101. Instead, the EPC declares that
inventions in all fields of technology are patentable, provided they are
susceptible to industrial application. 78 To be sure, the Convention then
goes on to exclude discoveries, scientific theories, and mathematical
methods, 79 as well as inventions the commercial exploitation of which
would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality, methods for treating the
human body, and diagnostic methods practiced on the human body. 80
While these exemptions could be read to exclude patents in the life
sciences arena, the EU enacted a Biotechnology Directive 81 to clarify
their availability. The Directive states that advances are patentable “even
if they concern a product consisting of or containing biological material
74. There are some indications that Myriad is doing just that. See Robert Cook-Deegan, John
M. Conley, James P. Evans & Daniel Vorhaus, The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical
Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUROPEAN J. HUMAN GENETICS 585 (2013).
75. See generally, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent
Innovation Incentives, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1115 (2015).
76. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Institute of Professional Representatives before the European
Patent Office in Support of Neither Party at 3; Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S.
Ct. 2511 (2016), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/15-1182-acInstitute-of-Professional-Representatives-Before-the-EuropeFalsepdf (noting that the Ariosa
decision has “world-wide implications, repeatedly conflict[s] with internationally accepted
standards of patent-eligibility . . . and jeopardize[s] research investment in medicine and other life
sciences”).
77. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5,
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1977), as amended by the Act revising the
Convention on the Grant of European Patents of Nov. 29, 2000 (entered into force Dec. 13, 2007),
its Implementing Regulations, Protocols, and Rules Relating to Fees [hereinafter EPC].
78. Id. at art. 52(1).
79. Id. at art. 52(2)(a).
80. Id. at art. 53(a) & (c).
81. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
legal protection of biotechnological inventions.
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or a process by means of which biological material is produced,
processed or used.” 82 In particular, “[b]iological material which is
isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a
technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously
occurred in nature.” 83 Similarly, diagnostic methods that are not
practiced on the body—including genetic diagnostics of the type at issue
in Mayo, Myriad, and Ariosa—are patentable. 84
Although EU patents can cover advances the U.S. Supreme Court
would regard as patent-ineligible natural laws or phenomena of nature,
these patents do not inhibit innovation within the EU. On the whole,
national laws determine the scope of infringement liability, and every
EU country recognizes a robust exemption for research. For example,
the German Patent Act states that the effects of a patent do not extend to
“acts done for experimental purposes related to the subject matter of the
patented invention.” 85 Commonly considered to distinguish between
research on the patented invention, which is permissible, and research
with the patented invention, which is not, this provision would protect
researchers such as those involved in the Integra and Embrex cases, as
well as those who study how genetic sequences affect health or use the
patented invention to verify the accuracy of existing testing
procedures. 86 Germany also has another provision to exempt research
necessary to meet premarket clearance requirements.87 Thus, research of
the sort conducted in Bolar would also be entitled to protection.
Significantly, however, neither of these provisions would cover the
situations that BIO was concerned with during the run up to the AIA.
Experiments with a patented input—use of an invention that is a research
tool for the purpose of conducting research—do not fall within the scope

82. Id. at art 3(1).
83. Id. at art. 3(2). That said, there are exclusions for, among other things, the human body,
art. 5(1), processes for cloning human beings, and uses of human embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes, art. 6(2)(a) & (c).
84. See, e.g., Geertrui Van Overwalle, Policy Levers Tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology:
Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 435, 455 (2011).
85. See, e.g., § 11 No. 2, German Patent Act. See also § 60 U.K. Patent Act; Japanese Patent
Law of 1959, as amended through May 6, 1998, effective June 1, 1998, § 69(1). See generally,
Hans-Rainer Jaenichen & Johann Pitz, Research Exemption/Experimental Use in the European
Union: Patents Do Not Block the Progress of Science, COLD SPRING HARBOR PERSPECTIVES IN
MEDICINE (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, Nov. 6, 2014), available at
http://perspectivesinmedicine.cshlp.org/content/5/2/a020941.full?sid=8eeea22f-8ab0-4a44-84a9ff20baa08523; Van Overwalle, supra note 84, at 490-91 (describing Belgian law).
86. See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
87. § 11 No. 2b German Patent Act. See also § 60(5)(i) UK Patent Act. See generally HansRainer Jaenichen & Johann Pitz, supra note 85, at 6-7.
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of either provision. 88 The same situation will apply if, as planned,
participating countries in the EU adopt a unitary patent. Under the
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, patent rights do not extend to acts
done privately and for non-commercial purposes, to acts done for
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented
invention, or to research necessary to generate data to clear
pharmaceuticals for marketing. 89
There are also other safeguards in Europe to protect the public
interest. Some European countries have taken the position that gene
product patents cover only the function disclosed in the patent. 90 Thus,
researchers are free to investigate patented genes for other functions and
uses. The Court of Justice of the European Union has further limited the
ambit of gene patents by holding that the patent on a gene is infringed
only when the gene is performing its biological function. 91 In addition,
unlike U.S. antitrust law, which permits a party with an exclusive
position to refuse to deal with potential licensees,92 European
competition law requires licensing when the refusal to deal would block
the appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer
demand, when the refusal to license would eliminate all competition, and
when the refusal lacks business justification. 93 Thus, Myriad’s
unwillingness to license laboratories to offer second opinions would
raise a question under European competition law (or it would create
enough of a concern to induce the right holder to license). Finally,
several EU countries’ patent laws include the possibility of awarding
compulsory licenses when patent holders interpose unreasonable
obstacles to access. 94
The bottom line is that in the EU, patents are available to motivate

88. Hans-Rainer Jaenichen & Johann Pitz, supra note 85, at 4.
89. AGREEMENT ON A UNIFIED PATENT COURT, art. 27 (a), (b) & (d), available at
https://www.unified-patent-court.org/sites/default/files/upc-agreement.pdf
[hereinafter
UPC
Agreement].
90. Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über den rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer
Erfindungen [Statute Implementing the European Council’s Biotechnology Directive], Jan. 21,
2005, BGBL I at 146, § 1a (4) (Ger.); CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L613-2-1 (Fr.).
91. Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 E.C.R. 7.
92. Verizon Comm’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08
(2004).
93. Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v. Commission of the
European Communities (Magill), 1995 ECR I-743 (Court of Justice Apr 6, 1995) (joining Cases C241/91P and C-242/91P).
94. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977 c 37, § 48A(1)(b)(i) (Eng); 2 J.W. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT
LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02, 2001). See also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Implications of the DNA
Patenting Dispute: A U.S. Response to Dianne Nicol, 22 J. L. INFO. & SCI. 1 (2013).
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research at the cutting edge of life sciences research, including work
required to isolate naturally occurring substances and find their
therapeutic value or to work that correlates genomic and phenomic
characteristics and contributes to the development of personalized
medicine. At the same time, the public’s interest is protected through
exemptions. To put this another way, many countries have created an
atmosphere that, as compared to the United States, is much more
conducive to research. Americans can certainly benefit from the work
accomplished in these other countries. For example, because research
data can be imported back into the United States even when produced
using methods patented in the United States, the drug approval process
would not change if life sciences research mainly took place abroad.95
However, the advantageous legal climate in other countries could easily
lead to research arbitrage, a decrease in research institutions and
research jobs in the United States, a brain drain, and eventually the loss
of U.S. technological dominance. 96
At one time, the notion that innovation would move abroad may
have seemed a rather remote possibility. After all, the U.S. government
provides outstanding support for research and U.S. lab facilities and
research personnel have long been viewed as the best in the world. It is
not, however, a sure thing that these advantages will continue. As other
countries have become aware of the importance of technological
innovation to the economy, other governments have begun to nurture
and support the research enterprise. A 2015 study of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is illuminating. 97 It
demonstrates that Asia and the EU are devoting increasing attention to
technological research and that the research and development (R&D)

95. See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (interpreting 35
U.S.C. § 271(g)).
96. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can
Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (2004). Cf. Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for
Abolition of Section 101 of the Patent Act, LAW 360 (April 12, 2016), available at
http://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-for-abolition-of-section-101-of-patent-act
(noting that Kappos, a former Director of the Patent and Trademark Office, “has begun telling
clients that patent protection for biotechnology and software inventions is more robust in other
countries like China and Europe and they are better off seeking patents in those places, because of
the way U.S. courts have interpreted Section 101”).
97. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD SCIENCE
TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY SCOREBOARD 2015: INNOVATION FOR GROWTH AND SOCIETY (2015),
available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/science-and-technology/
oecd-science-technology-and-industry-scoreboard-2015_sti_scoreboard-2015-en#page1 [hereinafter
OECD Scoreboard].
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expenditures of foreign companies are also on the rise. 98 This has
translated into an increase in scientific publications, particularly in
China, 99 which, in 2014, was also the leader in patent activity. Indeed, its
intellectual property office is receiving more applications than those in
the United States and Japan combined. 100 Significantly, the OECD study
also shows that international collaborations, as well as citations across
economies, are growing, 101 which suggests that scientists themselves
recognize that excellence in science is no longer concentrated in one
country. Researchers have also become more mobile. Where the United
States once experienced a net influx of scientists, the flow has changed
direction, as scientists now migrate to the places they view as offering
the best opportunities. 102 In a few technologies, the U.S. has already lost
its dominant position. 103
III. PROPOSALS
I am not alone in seeing the connections among the uncertainties
generated by § 101 jurisprudence, the concerns about investment in
innovation, and the ability to conduct research. The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office has convened two roundtables on subject-matter
eligibility and heard from a variety of individuals and institutions about
the need to change the law on which inventions are considered
patentable. 104 Tellingly, a statement filed by a group of twenty-two legal
practitioners and scholars linked the need to revise § 101 with the
experimental use defense, noting that clarification of the right to
experiment would “assure that no vestige remains of the Supreme
Court’s justification for imposing a judicial eligibility exception.”105 The
so-called Banbury Statement suggested legislatively overruling the
98. Id. at 15-16, 38, 57-60. See also id. at 97-100 (showing levels of support for higher
education and educational institutions, where research is performed, in the United States and
elsewhere).
99. Id. at 61.
100. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INDICATORS
23
(2015),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/
en/wipo_pub_941_2015.pdf.
101. OECD Scoreboard, supra note 97, at 66-67.
102. Id. at 68, 128-29.
103. Id. at 76, 78-79.
104. See Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/comments-public/patent-subject-mattereligibility-roundtable-2 (last updated Feb. 16, 2017).
105. BANBURY CENTER, COLD SPRING HARBOR LABORATORY, A PROPOSED PATH FORWARD
FOR LEGISLATIVELY ADDRESSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY LAW
(2016), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Banbury%20Statement.pdf.
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recent § 101 decisions, a revision to § 101 that would limit patents to
“inventions contributing to the technological arts,” and an exemption
“targeted in a manner that is consistent with the 2006 recommendation
of the National Academies.” 106
As always, the devil is in the details. I leave it to others to consider
the revision of § 101 (and to expound on what technological arts might
mean 107); here, I concentrate on the experimental use exemption. As
noted earlier, in the lead up to the AIA, several scholars proposed
research defenses. For example, Rebecca Eisenberg would have allowed
researchers to use patented materials without authorization, but in certain
types of cases, would have charged a “reasonable royalty” after the
invention was developed in order to compensate for the patent holder’s
initial investment. 108 Janice Mueller’s idea was to create a reach-through
royalty based on the contribution the patented input made to the products
the researcher developed.109 Maureen O’Rourke suggested the adoption
of a patent analogue to copyright’s four-factor fair use defense, 110 but
would have suggested five factors and, unlike in copyright, would have
allowed the court to levy a royalty in some cases.111 Because the actual
payments under all these proposals would have been difficult to
calculate and, in most cases, the calculation would occur long after the
infringement, it was not certain that any of them would be effective in
enticing researchers to make full use of patented inputs.
In my earlier work, I took a somewhat different tack and suggested
that bona fide researchers (as determined by their institutional
affiliation) be required to seek authorization from the patentee.
However, if the patent holder refused to license, the researcher could
then use the technology without permission. There was, however a
catch: researchers who used patented material without authorization
would be required to commit to publishing the resulting research and
either put the advances made into the public domain or patent them
under the understanding that they would be licensed out on a
nonexclusive basis and on reasonable terms. 112 My thinking was that the
106. Id. at 1.
107. See, e.g., David J. Kappos, John R. Thomas & Randall J. Bluestone, A Technological
Contribution Requirement for Patentable Subject Matter: Supreme Court Precedent and Policy, 6
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 152 (2008).
108. Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1078.
109. Mueller, supra note 45, at 58.
110. O’Rourke, supra note 41, at 1208-09; 17 U.S.C. § 107.
111. Id.
112. Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 471. See also Richard R. Nelson, The Market Economy and the
Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL’Y 467 (2004) (endorsing this proposal).
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identification requirement would eliminate the need to determine what
constituted a research use. Further, this scheme would encourage
scientists engaged in fundamental research to make their work freely
available or available on reasonable terms, and it would obviate the need
to engage in complex royalty calculations on downstream commercial
products.
However, since I made this recommendation, two things have
happened—one that weakens it and one that somewhat strengthens it.
On the negative side, the rise in collaborative research and institutional
interest in patenting have made it much more difficult to identify bona
fide basic researchers by their affiliation. The Bayh-Dole Act has turned
academics into entrepreneurs and many of their spin-off companies (and
the firms that acquire these spin offs) also engage in the sort of research
that should be regarded as basic, fundamental science.113 Thus, the limit
placed on who can benefit from the exemption no longer makes sense;
should this proposal move forward, it would have to be expanded to all
researchers and include a definition of “experimental.” On the positive
side, the idea of requiring patent holders to promise to freely license on
reasonable terms now has considerable currency, for this type of
licensing is regularly used by standard-setting organizations to ensure
that the patents essential to a standard are freely available to all the
participants in an industry. 114 While there are sometimes problems in
determining what constitutes a reasonable royalty, 115 reasonable and
nondiscriminatory licensing (RAND) has been shown to be a feasible
way of ensuring the accessibility of materials that are needed to facilitate
interoperability (e.g. among cellphones), backward and forward
compatibility (for things like word processing programs), and the
prevention of products (like the betamax video system) from becoming
stranded. There are strong commonalities between scientists researching
the same technical problem who need the same inputs and firms
manufacturing equipment that need technological components drawn to
the same specifications. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the same
solutions might be applicable to both problems. Interestingly, Ryan
Vacca and his coauthors have suggested the use of a RAND licensing

113. Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Tailoring Incentives: A Comment on Hemel and
Ouellette’s Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 131, 136 (2014); See also Peter Lee,
Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 37-38 (2013).
114. See generally, Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231 (2014).
115. See Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars:
Triangulating the End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 35-47 (2014).
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scheme in the seed sector, which presents another situation in which an
input is patented, yet fundamental to an entire industry. 116
Still, a reasonable royalty is not the same as free, and as we have
seen in other developed countries, experimental uses are free of any
payment obligation. Katherine Strandburg has come the closest to
proposing an equivalent resolution for the United States. 117 Her idea is to
adopt the “use on/use with” distinction and thus permit essentially the
same unauthorized uses permitted in Europe. 118 While she would tack on
a compulsory license scheme to ensure the availability of research tools
to conduct research, 119 it is likely that such an addition would continue
to be a deal breaker for tool manufacturers such as the members of BIO.
But because, as Strandburg notes in another article, the tools of interest
to fundamental researchers are often invented by other fundamental
researchers, 120 the self-help measures developed by AUTM and the NIH
may be sufficient to ensure their availability. 121
The remaining question is whether a statute of this type would
provide enough certainty to patent holders, researchers, or courts.
Because the measure appears to work exceedingly well elsewhere,122
U.S. courts could rely on foreign case law to flesh out the rudimentary
distinction between “on” and “with.” In any event, the provision likely
operates less as a rule of decision in infringement litigation and more as
a norm generally agreed upon by the scientific community, or as an in
terrorem clause that prevents right holders from denying researchers the
right to experiment. Nonetheless, more detail may be required for an
exemption to be politically palatable in countries like the United States,
which is highly litigious and relies on a common law method that can
obfuscate rather than clarify poorly specified standards. A study by the
UK Royal Society, referring to the EU situation, found that between the
extremes of infringement and exemption “there is doubtful ground, and
prudent people avoid doubtful ground.” 123 Thus, it concluded that it
116. Benjamin M. Cole, Brent J. Horton & Ryan Vacca, Food for Thought: Genetically
Modified Seeds As De Facto Standard-Essential Patents, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 313, 347-53 (2014)
(suggesting the use of RAND licenses in cases in which a farmer can show that a genetically
modified seed has become a de facto standard).
117. Strandburg, supra note 41, at 119-22. See also Katherine J. Strandburg, Bend or Break?
The Patent System in Crisis: Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 142-46.
120. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79
U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008).
121. See supra text accompanying note 46.
122. See e.g., Jaenichen & Pitz, supra note 85.
123. THE ROYAL SOCIETY, KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN: THE EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
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would be “conducive to the development of science if the position of
scientific work under these exemptions was clearer.” 124
AIPLA’s 2006 proposal included substantially more detail.
Notably, this formulation was substantially accepted as a
recommendation by the National Academies’ Committee on Intellectual
Property Rights in Genomic and Protein Research and Innovation, and it
was endorsed in the Banbury Statement issued in 2016. Built in part on a
bill considered by the House of Representatives in 1990, 125 the proposal,
as reformulated by the National Academies, would expand upon the
research on/research [with] distinction as follows:
Making or using a patented invention should not be considered
infringing if done to discern or discover:
a. the validity of the patent and scope of afforded protection;
b. the features, properties or inherent characteristics or advantages of
the invention;
c. novel methods of making or using the patented invention; or
d. novel alternatives, improvements, or substitutes.

Further, making or using the invention in activities incidental to
preparations for commercialization of a non-infringing alternative
should also be noninfringing. 126
This exemption would permit the research in Integra, where the
idea was to find other uses for the wound-healing medicine (subsection
(c)); it would also cover the researcher in Embrex who was looking for
alternative ways to inoculate chick eggs (subsection (d)). It would
similarly immunize from liability work carried out to discover other
PROPERTY POLICY ON THE CONDUCT OF SCIENCE, § 3.23 (2003), available at
https://royalsociety.org/~/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2003/9845.pdf.
124. Id.
125. The House proposal would have added 35 U.S.C. § 271(j):
(j) It shall not be an act of infringement to make or use a patented invention solely for
research or experimentation purposes unless the patented invention has a primary
purpose of research or experimentation. If the patented invention has a primary purpose
of research or experimentation, it shall not be an act of infringement to manufacture or
use such invention to study, evaluate, or characterize such invention or to create a
product outside the scope of the patent covering such invention. This subsection does not
apply to a patented invention to which subsection (e)(1) applies.
H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. § 402 (1990). See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
ASSOCIATION, RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT ENTITLED “A PATENT SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY” at 26, available at http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/executive/
Documents/NAS092304.pdf [hereinafter AIPLA RESPONSE].
126. REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 42, at 14; AIPLA RESPONSE, supra note 125, at 25.
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causes of early-onset breast cancer (subsections (c) and (d)), and
incidental uses of the patented inventions to verify the accuracy of
Myriad’s tests for BRCA 1 and 2-related breast cancers. However, it
would not permit the unauthorized use Duke was making of the laser at
issue in Madey, for that is best analyzed as research use with the laser. 127
But that is a feature, not a bug: as we have seen, an exemption for
research use of research tools is problematic because it could arguably
undermine incentives to invent research tools.
In short, the National Academies/AIPLA provision targets exactly
the activities that should be beyond the scope of infringement liability
while identifying the uses that should be subject to the patent holder’s
authority, and it ensures that those that are within that authority will not
be found exempt from liability. Presumably, it is this careful wording
that allowed Hans Sauer, Deputy General Counsel of BIO, to join the
Banbury Statement and come around to the notion that a legal regime
that includes a robust safeguard for research offers a better environment
for biomedical science.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States patent system is no longer well suited to the
needs of the life sciences sector. Patents cannot be obtained in many key
areas, including for the development of medicines that involve naturally
occurring materials such as proteins, hormones, enzymes, or vitamins.
More important, there is likely insufficient protection for the important
new field of personalized medicine. While that arena does not currently
require the extensive testing demanded of pharmaceuticals and medical
devices, the FDA is interested in ensuring the quality of these tests, and
thus the situation could easily change. 128 The Supreme Court denied
protection in these areas out of concern that patents would chill research
and impair the advancement of science. In fact, however, the current
legal climate risks the ability of the United States to fully participate in
the Knowledge Economy and threatens its competitive position as an
innovator. It is therefore time to consider reinstating a research
exemption to patent liability. With such an exemption, the patent system
127. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has hinted that a better view of Madey may be as a research
tool case, see Integra Lifesciences I, LTD. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). See also id. at 878 (Newman, J., dissenting).
128. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, PAVING THE WAY FOR PERSONALIZED
MEDICINE: THE FDA’S ROLE IN A NEW ERA OF MEDICAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT (2013),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/PersonalizedMedicine/
UCM372421.pdf.
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would be available to incentivize fundamental research and patents
would no longer endanger the onward march of science.
This paper focused on the research exemption. However, it also
behooves Congress to consider the environment for research more
generally. Refusals to deal are also exacting a toll on scientific inquiry.
Thus, a harder look at anticompetitive conduct on the part of patent
holders would likewise be worthwhile. Lawmakers should consider
invigorating the patent misuse defense, restoring antitrust liability, and
introducing law that would permit compulsory licenses in cases where
right holders block the ability of researchers to develop new products or
otherwise prevent such products from entering the marketplace.
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